Introduction 7
Increasingly, both market-based instruments (MBIs) and the concept of ecosystem services (ESs) have 8 gained favor in the environmental policy, planning and ecological conservation world (Pirard & 9 Lapeyre, 2014). ESs are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems, which frames the relationship 10 between humans and the rest of nature (Costanza et al., 2014; MA, 2005 MBIs have been gradually adopted to serve the governance of coastal and marine ESs. There are 27 wetland mitigation banks, tradable development rights of flooding zones, eco-labels of fish products, 28 and payment for ecosystem services (Binet et al. 
Results: MBIs for ESs in Chinese coastal and marine governance 251
After analyzing the data from the case, we summarized the key findings in 
BASUR 257

Price 258
Making sea use rights tradable has been increasingly adopted in China. 
293
BASUR is also conditioned by sanctions for noncompliance of both users and government agencies. 294 Users who cheat in transactions and change the approved utilization should be fined; government 295 agencies that fail to conduct supervision should accept penalties (QDHDG, 2015 prices. 344
Spatial consideration 345
Governance of BASUR demonstrates spatial features in terms of matching administrative scales and 346 functional zones, and taking in situ differences into consideration for starting prices. BASUR takes 347 place within administrative scales since the use rights are administratively secured. Moreover, use 348 purposes of traded areas are required to be consistent with marine functional zones, which define, as 349 an expert from the Ocean University of China explained, "different attributes of marine resources 350 particularly in territorial water and for which purpose those natural resources can be used." This 351 consideration guarantees that activities decided through biddings/auctions are appropriate for a given 352 spatial area. Also, these ecological attributes, together with geographical, social, and economic 353 differences, are critical for designing starting prices (SOA, 2013a). Specifically, national delimitation 354 of sea-use grades and patterns distinguishes place-based values and ecological costs, serving as an 355 essential foundation for setting starting prices. 356
CMEDC & SFR 357
Price 358
CMEDC and SFR are the current mainstream of payments for ESs in Chinese coastal and marine 359 governance. Both payment mechanisms draw on input for ecological restoration (e.g., costs of 360 infrastructure, monitoring, assessment, and consultation) and the foregone net benefits from ESs (i.e. 361 opportunity costs). CMEDC brings evaluation forward to specific ESs; namely, prices on losses of 362 fisheries and water purification service are taken into account (SOA, 2013b). An official from the 363 National Development and Reform Commission noted that: 364 "Current focus is on the quantity loss of material objects. Actually, values of other services like regulating 365 services should be dominant in marine compensation. However, who is willing to believe it and pay? A 366 middle course is thus evaluating tangible or easily-calculated things."
367
In a recent pilot, more intangible services have been measured and adopted in National Marine Nature 368
Reserves. This scheme cultivates regulatory rigidity and rich data, in which higher ES prices are 369 expected to gain great acceptance. 370
Regulatory support 371
As mentioned above, CMEDC is about users' payments for ecological damage caused by their 372 activities to compensate providers' losses. SFR is a hierarchical payment from government to 373 encourage users' positive activities for ES provision. These two payment mechanisms determine a 374 strong reliance on regulations. Assessment on ecological losses and payments has been stimulated by 375 environmental impact assessment (GB/T19485-2014; SOA, 2010 
Coordination 400
The two MBIs demonstrate different coordination. The first concern is about the involved actors. 
407
From the supply side, marine administrative agencies act on behalf of the State or fishermen to claim 408 for compensation (as 'intermediary providers' of ESs), and also perform a role of 'management 409 intermediaries' to operate and monitor CMEDC (SOA, 2014b). The planner from the National 410
Oceanic Technology Center criticized the dual position as follows: "Those agencies are apt to employ 411 power to control more resources through finance distribution…They have a mandate to immunize 412 against CMEDC for industrial programs that would greatly enhance economic outputs." For SFR, 413 freedom of participation is delegated to providers (e.g. fishermen or contractors of artificial fish reef). 414 Local governments can be seen as service providers also when they receive the State's payments for 415 operating public welfare programs. Marine administrative agencies are 'intermediary users' (as 416 representative of final beneficiaries) to assign a revenue from the demand side and take charge of SFR 417 operation and supervision (MAO, 2013 shortcomings of Chinese coastal and marine governance are also revealed, including the exclusion of 456 major ES values from price setting, inflexible assessment rules, political pressures on market 457 coordination, and the administrative scales at which MBIs are operated. In the remainder of this 458 section, the advantages and shortcomings for each distinctive aspect will be discussed. 459 In China, prices are significantly attached to land/sea uses and inputs, rather than to clearly-defined 460 may maximize social benefits (Farley & Costanza, 2010 Overall, as the majority of coastal and marine ESs are common pool or public resources, and as their 511 property rights belong to the State, Chinese governments promote MBIs in their own way -with 512 strong reliance on hierarchical support and their past strengths to provide economic incentives. 513 Consequently, the use of MBIs in Chinese coastal and marine governance only shows part of the four 514 distinctive governance aspects of MBIs. Based on the above analysis, governance improvements 515 could be made for a better use of the analyzed MBIs in China. 516
Efforts for improvement 517
To improve the implementation of the analyzed MBIs, three important governance efforts could be 518 made. First, the major value of coastal and marine ESs should be integrated. A comprehensive 519 assessment system that defines which, and how to identify and evaluate, critical ESs is needed. To 520 keep a lower level of transaction costs, such an assessment system could be refined step-by-step based 521 on existing databases and tools (Primmer & Furman, 2012) . Moreover, to reveal optimal prices of ESs 522 in a dynamic market and inform assessment settings, the frequency of transactions should be 523
increased. This requires broadening the scope of tradable ES-related proxies and imposing explicit 524 property rules. 525 Enhancing social learning and recognition for the payments for coastal and marine resources is also 526 worthwhile. Creating better partnership atmosphere and communicating channels to share social, 527 economic, and ecological information can be recommended so that more awareness and support can 528 be built for MBIs (Chobotová, 2013 Moreover, Chinese coastal and marine governance has a clear focus on improving policy coordination 552 by reducing transaction costs in a largely non-market environment. 553 Overall, the analytical framework that emphasizes the four distinctive governance features of MBIs 554 for ESs; namely price, regulatory support, coordination, and spatial consideration, has proven to be 555 useful to gain insights into the utilization of MBIs for the governance of coastal and marine ESs. The 556 empirical analysis of, and the general implications for, Chinese practice contribute to the ongoing 557 discussions about the need to understand MBIs and ES governance complexity better. 558
